Seminar: Investment timing under financing constraint with bank and market debt

SpeakerTakashi Shibata
AffiliationTokyo Metropolitan University
DateThursday, 22 Mar 2012
Time12:00 - 13:00
LocationRoom 102, 1-19 Torrington Place
Event seriesCSML Joint Seminar Series

We examine the optimal investment timing decision problem of a firm subject to a bank and market debt financing constraint in which banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy. Optimal investment thresholds have a U-shaped relation with the respective bank and market debt capacity constraint. Optimal debt structures depend on cash flow volatility and bargaining power in private workouts for a given debt capacity constraint. By increasing the debt capacity constraint, the firm is more likely to issue the market debt than the bank debt when the investment is exercised. If the firm does not possess the bargaining power in private workouts, the firm issues bank debt. If the firm possesses a slight or more bargaining power, it is likely that the firm prefers market bank for lower volatility, while the firm prefers bank debt for higher volatility. These results fit well with the findings of empirical studies concerning debt structures.

iCalendar csml_id_17.ics